A VPN (Virtual Private Network) is a private data network that uses a non-private data network to carry traffic between remote sites. An "Intranet VPN" establishes network layer connectivity between remote Intranet sites by creating an IP overlay network over the non-private network, using various tunneling mechanisms. There are two approaches for establishing such tunnels: a "CPEbased approach" and a "network-based approach". In the first approach, tunnels are established only between the CPE devices, whereas in the second approach tunnels are also established between the routers of the core non-private network. In this paper we address the problem of determining a CPEbased and a network-based layout of VPN tunnels while taking into account two factors: the cost of the links over which the VPN tunnels are established and the cost of the core routers that serve as end points for the VPN. We define related graph algorithm problems, analyze their complexity, and presents heuristics for solving these problems efficiently.
mainly from the perspective of the ISP operating the core network, for scalability and economic reasons, network-based solutions for VPNs are preferred.
To better understand the trade-off between the two approaches, consider Figure 1 where a network example and the associated graph are depicted. In this example there are 3 corporate networks, referred to as Net-1, Net-2 and Net-3, that need to be connected by a VPN across a core network. The three networks are connected to the core network by means of three border routers: 3 . The cost of the VPN in this example is 11: 3 for using the link between d 3 and R 3 plus 2 for using the link between d 1 and R 3 plus 2*3 for using the link between d 1 and R 3 twice. In Figure 2 (b) the networks routers support VPN. Hence, the routers can serve as the end points of tunnels, and the cost of the VPN is reduced to 10 (2+4+1+3). In Figure 2 (c) the networks routers also support VPN. However, here R 3 rather than R 4 is employed as an end point of the VPN tunnels, and the cost of the VPN is reduced to 8.
From this example it is clear that when the core routers are capable of functioning as end points of VPN tunnels, the routing cost for the VPN can be reduced. However, this does not come with no cost because each VPN tunnel terminated at a core router is associated with management and memory complexity on that router. To understand the reason for this, consider the VPN in In this paper we address the problem of determining a layout of VPN tunnels while taking into problems, analyze their complexity, and presents several heuristics for solving these problems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the problem of determining a VPN layout while limiting the usage of core routers. This problem will be referred to as the Minimum Cost VPN Problem (MC-VPN). We then show that this problem is both NP-hard and hard to approximate. We show that the same results hold for another version of this problem, called Minimal Active Set VPN (MAS-VPN). In Section 3 we present two heuristics for solving the MC-VPN problem. Though the presented algorithms achieve no strict theoretic approximation ratios, in practice they perform very respectfully. This is shown by simulation results in Section 4.
Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
The Minimum Cost VPN Problem
The layout of VPN tunnels can be optimized to satisfy different optimization parameters, like bandwidth, survivability, minimum hops between source and destination pairs etc. However, one of 5 the most important factors is usually minimum cost. We assume that when a tunnel is established over a link, it encounters a cost which is associated with this link. Though a strict association between a tunnel and links does not exist when tunnels are established using a connectionless mechanism like IP-over-IP, it is expected that future VPNs will be established over connectionoriented tunnels using technologies like ATM, MPLS or WDM.
Our model allows each link to have a different cost on every direction. Therefore, the core network is represented by a directed graph 1 . The cost of each link on every direction is determined based on administrative considerations of the core network operator (ISP) and on the bandwidth allocated over that link, explicitly or implicitly, for the VPN tunnel. Generally, overloaded links are expected to be more costly than underloaded links. Since network links have different capacity on each direction 2 , and different load on each direction, we believe that a directed graph reflects more accurately the behavior of a real network.
In the following, the routers connecting the remote networks to the core network (
in Figure 1 ) are referred to as "the border routers" whereas the other routers (R 1 − R 4 in Figure 1) are referred to as "the core routers". The nodes that function as end-points of tunnels, like R 4 in Figure 2 (b), are referred to as "active core nodes". By definition, every border router is an active node. When the routers of the core network do not support VPN, the VPN paths (tunnels) would have to start and end only at the border routers. In such a case the group of active nodes is equal to the group of border nodes, as in Figure 2 (a).
As already indicated, in this work we concentrate upon the establishment of the minimum cost VPN (MC-VPN). An immediate consequence is that the VPN tunnels form a tree, because in any circle of VPN tunnels one tunnel can be removed in order to reduce the cost of the layout without affecting connectivity. Since our core network is represented by a directed graph, there are several options to set up a minimum cost tree spanning a group of nodes. In order to define a unique solution, we assume that one of the branch networks connected by the VPN is the corporate headquarter where most of the corporate servers are located, and that the majority of traffic is sent from the head-quarter to the other branches. Therefore, we will seek for a directed tree of VPN tunnels rooted at a head-quarter border node and spanning the rest of the border nodes.
Assuming that using a core router as an active node incurs a price, our goal is to find a minimal cost set of tunnels/paths forming a logical tree rooted at the head-quarter border router and spanning the other border routers, such that the cost of the active nodes used is below a given bound. A formal definition of this problem is as follows: 
∀v ∈ M \ s there exists a sequence of one or more directed paths in T that leads from s to v.
The solution to MC-VPN induces a logical directed tree rooted at s and spanning M \ s. This is a "real" spanning tree in an induced graph G (A, E ) where an edge between two vertices in A exists if and only if a path between these vertices exists in the original graph G. Note, that a solution to MC-VPN may actually induce a subgraph that is not a tree in G.
Our cost model is motivated by the work performed in [5] . This work discusses the possible VPN topologies, and the trade-off between the cost of routing, the cost of tunnel set up and maintenance, and the cost of activating internal nodes as end points of VPN tunnels. The design of a VPN is relatively simple if the main target is to minimize the usage of bandwidth. In such a case the VPN should consist of the collection of "shortest paths" from the headquarter node to each of the other sites of the VPN. However, in many networks today, and in most of the future networks, the cost of operation and maintenace of virtual topologies is larger than the cost of the bandwidth.
Our model considers such a network. It therfore does not aim in minimizing the cost of bandwidth usage, but the cost of operation and maintenace of the virtual topology. The weight associated with every link indicates in our model the cost of building and maintaining a VPN tunnel over this link, regardless of the volume of traffic the link actually carries for each VPN. Such a cost includes 7 the need to set up a tunnel, to maintain the tunnel (e.g. forwarding the "KEEP-ALIVE" messages exchanged between the two end points) and to hold tunnel information (e.g. the VCI/VPI value in the case of an ATM-based tunnel, or the LSP in the case of an MPLS-based tunnel). This cost is incurred for each tunnel, and therefore a link that participates in several tunnels of the same VPN encounters this overhead for each tunnel independently of the other tunnels. This gives rise to our requirement that p∈T e∈p c(e) has to be minimized.
The cost of tunnel maintenance incurred by the intermediate nodes of a tunnel, is different than the cost incurred by the tunnel end points. This is due to the following two reasons:
• These nodes need to do a more extensive tunnel maintenance work. E.g. to have a timer that dictates when a KEEP-ALIVE message has to be sent over the tunnel.
• These nodes need to maintain not only the tunnel but also the VPN itself. For instance, node Figure 2 (b) needs to run a routing protocol (see [5] , and [10] for a particular example) and to maintain routing tables in order to determine how to route a packet received from d 1 whose
Node R 4 also needs a special logic in order to determine the VPN to which a received packet belongs to (e.g. using a "VPN identifier" as proposed in [3] ). Although MC-VPN assumes that every core router has VPN capability, this assumption may be easily bypassed by assigning infinite costs to nodes that do not have such capability. In order to seek for a layout that use no active core router, the fund F can be set to 0.
MC-VPN imposes no restriction on the active group A, except that this group must include all border routers. Note that the cost of active nodes within the group of border routers is not considered as part of the VPN cost, since the border nodes must be active, and their cost is a constant factor in any feasible solution.
If the funds F is infinite, MC-VPN reduces to the classic Steiner Tree Problem (STP) [4] The balance between the node and edge cost function may depend heavily on the details of the core network implementation, such as the processing power of core routers, their memory resources, 3 A core router is said to be activated when it becomes an end point of a tunnel.
9 the cost of setting up and taking down VPN tunnels between core routers, the cost of executing a routing protocol for every VPN, and many other factors. However, as shown in the following even if either of these costs becomes negligible, the complexity of MC-VPN remains NP-hard 4 .
Theorem 1: MC-VPN is NP-Hard, and also hard to approximate.
Proof:
This follows from the relation of MC-VPN to the directed Steiner tree problem. In [9] it is shown that the version of STP on directed graphs is NP-hard as well as hard to approximate in the sense that an approximation algorithm achieving an approximation ratio lower than O(log n)
does not exist unless DT IM E(n polylog(n) ) ⊇ N P (this assumption is believed to be as unlikely as P = N P ). We note that MC-VPN reduces to the directed STP when the funds F available for active nodes are infinite. Therefore, the same hardness results apply to MC-VPN as well.
Suppose now that the only goal is to minimize the number of active nodes. This gives rise to the following problem definition.
Problem 2: Minimal Active Set VPN (MAS-VPN). Given a directed graph G(V, E), a group M ⊂ V of border nodes and a head-quarter border node s ∈ M , find a tree T rooted at s and spanning M with a set of fork nodes
A such that |A \ M | is minimal.
MAS-VPN and MC-VPN are closely related. MAS-VPN may be viewed as a version of MC-VPN
where the cost of all edges is zero, the cost of all nodes is one and the goal is to minimize the funds used for activating core routers. The difference between these two problems is that MC-VPN allows a solution to use every edge more than once.
Theorem 2: MAS-VPN is NP-Hard, and also hard to approximate

Proof:
We show that MAS-VPN is NP-Hard by reducing the Minimum Set Cover (MSC) problem to it. MSC is known to be NP-Complete [4] , and is defined as follows:
Let C be a collection of subsets of a finite set S, and K ≤ |C| a positive integer. Does C contain a cover for S of size K or less, i.e., a subset C ⊆ C with |C | ≤ K such that every element of S belongs to at least one member of C ? 
Clearly, the above defined T and A comprise a solution to MAS-VPN although the size of T may still be reducible. Thus,
To prove the other direction, let T and A be a solution to MAS-VPN on G such that |A\M | ≤ K.
Define the following solution to MSC:
C covers S since by definition T must reach every node m j through some edge (n i , m j ), and by construction, if (n i , m j ) ∈ T then j ∈ c i . The only potential fork nodes in T are the nodes n i . By definition, T must contain all edges of the form (n i , q i ), since these are the only edges entering the nodes q i . Thus, every node n i which has an outgoing edge of the form (n i , m j ) must be a fork node
By using the same construction in the above proof, it can be shown that every approximation algorithm for MAS-VPN achieving an approximation ratio of K on the size of the set A \ M, can be used to achieve the same approximation ratio on MSC. For MSC it is known that unless
DT IM E(n polylog(n) ) ⊇ N P , no algorithm can achieve a better approximation ratio than K = O(log n) [8] . Therefore, under the same assumption, MAS-VPN is at least as hard to approximate.
Algorithms for MC-VPN
As proved in Section 2, MC-VPN is NP-hard and therefore a polynomial algorithm that finds an optimal solution is unlikely to exist. We therefore concentrate on heuristics that approximate the optimal solution. Two basic approximation algorithms for MC-VPN are presented. Both algorithms use the same general approach. They first construct a CPE-based solution, that ignores the ability to use core routers as end points of VPN tunnels. Then, they try to improve the solution by spending the funds F on active core routers in strategic points. In Section 2 it was shown that MC-VPN is not only NP-hard, but also likely to be hard to approximate. Therefore, the presented algorithms achieve no strict theoretic approximation ratios. However, in practice they perform very respectfully.
Building a CPE-based solution to MC-VPN
The first step in our approximation algorithms is to build a CPE-based solution for MC-VPN, that does not use any core router. Such a solution is a set of paths with endpoints exclusively within the group M of border routers.
We present two algorithms for the construction of such a solution. In [9] , the SCTF algorithm for STP on directed graphs was proposed. The first proposed algorithm, called the Active Shortest
Path Heuristic (ASPH), is a slightly altered SCTF algorithm. The algorithm starts at the root (head-quarter) node s, and covers in each iteration of the algorithm exactly one new node from the group M of border routers. The covered node is the node nearest to one of the previously covered border router nodes, and the shortest path between these two nodes is added to the solution.
A similar procedure is employed by the Shortest Path Heuristic (SPH) [12] , except that in our algorithm, ASPH, all paths added to the solution must begin and end at border router nodes. This implies that some edges might be used more than once.
An example of this phase of the algorithm is depicted in Figure 5 . The head-quarter node is s and the border router group is
The set of paths constructed in this example, listed in the order they are found, is {(s,
Note that these paths are not disjoint. E.g. the edge (x 0 , x 2 ) is used by two of the above paths.
The resulting solution is shown in Figure 5 (b).
ASPH as presented above may be implemented to run in O(|M |(|E| + |V |log|V |) time by using
an efficient procedure for the shortest path routine. A formal description of ASPH appears in as follows:
Algorithm 1: Active Shortest Path Heuristic (ASPH).
Find a CPE-based solution to MC-VPN:
X ← {s}, T ← Φ. While M \ X = Φ do (a) Find the shortest p path connecting a vertex x ∈ X to a vertex v ∈ M \ X. (b) T ← T ∪ {p} (c) X ← X ∪ {v} 2. A ← M
Call OPTIMIZE(T, A
). 
(T, A) is the desired solution.
The second algorithm we present for building a CPE-based solution to MC-VPN is the Active Double Tree Heuristic (ADTH). Many algorithms for solving the Steiner Tree Problem (STP) are known in the literature (i.e. [1] , [9] , [12] ). ADTH can use any of these algorithms as a basis for constructing a solution. As an example we use the SPH algorithm [12] . Figure 6(a) shows the spanning tree found by SPH in the network of Figure 5 (a). Note that starting with a tree implies that some fork nodes may not belong to the group M of border routers. Thus, the second phase of ADTH transforms the tree found by the initial phase (SPH, in our case) into a set of paths with endpoints exclusively within M . The paths are constructed by touring the tree in a depth-first manner. This tour is broken into subpaths such that every time a vertex belonging to the group of border nodes is passed, the previous subpath is ended and a new one is initiated. Unneeded paths, that lead to border routers already reached by previous paths, are discarded. The paths created from the tree are depicted in Figure 6 
Activating core routers
After a valid CPE-based solution for MC-VPN has been constructed by either of the above algorithms, it is the responsibility of the node activation optimization procedure to eliminate multiple use of edges wherever this is possible. The target of this procedure is to revise the CPE-based solution such that every node and edge is used once at the most if this can be achieved by activating core routers with the available funds F .
A possible optimization procedure is described hereafter. This procedure examines all core router nodes in the solution with more than one incoming edge. The order in which the nodes are activated is intended to maximize the profit of node activation, defined as the sum of edge costs saved as the result of activation. A core router node is considered a candidate for activation if its cost is less than the remaining funds F . A candidate node is activated if the ratio between the profit and cost of its activation is the largest among the ratios achieved by all other candidate nodes.
When a node is activated, the optimization procedure must ensure that the remaining incoming path still connects the head-quarter node s to the new active node, so that the correctness of the solution is preserved. If at some stage of the algorithm, an activated node remains with only one outgoing edge, i.e. it becomes a simple intermediate node on some path, it is deactivated, and its cost is returned to the available funds.
As an example we describe how the proposed local optimization procedure optimizes the initial solution constructed by ASPH as depicted in Figure 5 (b) and given as a reference also in Figure   7 (a). Assume that the weight of all nodes in the considered network is 1, and that the available funds are F = 2. The initial set of candidate nodes is {x 0 , x 2 , x 3 }. The profit of their individual activation is {2, 5, 2} respectively. For example, activating x 2 would enable removing two partial paths reaching it: s → x 0 → x 2 and d 4 → x 2 . Because x 2 must remain reachable from s, it is not possible to remove both partial paths reaching x 2 from the direction of x 0 which are the most expensive paths reaching it. Since all nodes are assumed to have the same costs, the profit/cost ratio of x 2 is the largest and it is the first candidate node to be activated. As a result, the above mentioned partial paths can be removed from the solution. After x 2 is activated, x 0 is no longer a candidate for activation since its incoming degree becomes 1. Therefore, the only remaining 16 candidate node is x 3 . The optimized solution created after x 3 is activated too is depicted in Figure   7 (b).
The order in which nodes are activated is not necessarily optimal, but is a heuristic frequently used for similar problems such as the Knapsack problem [4] . For instance, in the above example, assume that x 0 , x 2 and x 3 have a cost of 1, 3 and 4 respectively, and that the available funds are F = 3. In such a case, x 0 is the first (and only) node to be activated since its profit/cost ratio, 2, is larger than the ratios of x 2 and x 3 , which are 5/3 and 2/4 respectively. However, in this example, activating x 2 would result in a better solution.
An alternative heuristic, which performs better in the last case activates the candidate nodes starting at the node furthest away from the head-quarter node s and gradually nears s until the funds are exhausted. This heuristic, which we call the reverse-BFS heuristic, was tested in simulations and performs on the average slightly worse than the profit/cost heuristic.
The formal description of the node activation optimization procedure appears in the following.
Its time complexity is O(|V |
2 |E| 2 ), a value which can be reduced by a less naive implementation that updates cost evaluations incrementally. (c) Let x be a vertex in C for which ∀v ∈ C : r(x) ≤ r(v). x has the lowest cost/profit ratio of all candidate nodes. Therefore, this is the node selected for activation.
Procedure 1: OP T IM IZE(T,
ii. Let p tail be the tail of p beginning at 
Simulation Results
In the previous section, two algorithms for approximating MC-VPN were introduced. In this section the performance of these algorithms is evaluated on random graphs. Although real-world networks are not completely random in their structure, we believe the simulation results predict quite accurately the behavior of the proposed algorithms in a realistic setting.
The algorithms were tested on random directed graphs generated as follows. First, a graph with 50 vertices and 150 edges was created, where every possible edge in the graph was selected with equal probability. The weights of these edges were initialized at random values uniformly distributed between 2 and 22. Antisymmetric edges were assigned equal weights. This part of the graph was intended to model the backbone of a large network. Another 50 vertices were connected to this graph -one to every backbone vertex. The connection was made by one edge from the backbone to the new vertex with a weight generated as described above, and one edge from the new vertex to the backbone with a weight randomly distributed between 20 and 220. This connection was intentionally made asymmetrical, thereby modeling end-user connections such as ADSL, cable-modem or satellite links.
On every graph, the algorithms were run on every border router group M size between 3 and 49, including the head-quarter node. These groups were reselected at random for every graph and every group size from the set of end-user vertices. The weight of border routers was assumed to be equal to 1 for all nodes. The funds available for using core routers ranged from 1 to 20 (i.e. a maximum of 20 nodes were allowed to be activated). The results were averaged over 50 different graphs. Confidence intervals for several points were calculated and found to be within the 90%.
The algorithms were compared to the well known approximation algorithm for the Steiner tree problem SPH [12] . This algorithm constructs solutions to the Steiner tree problem that are at most twice as expensive as the optimal solution and is known to be even better on the average [12] . SPH does not find a valid solution for MC-VPN, since it constructs a spanning tree and not a set of paths. However, the cost of this tree is a lower bound on the cost of an optimal solution to MC-VPN, since it ignores the bound F on the available funds for active nodes. It serves as a benchmark since calculating the optimal solution is an NP-hard problem (see Section 2).
The VPN cost achieved by the algorithms is depicted in Figure 8 . In this figure the VPN costs of ASPH and ADTH before and after the node activation optimization procedure are shown for various available funds. When no funds for active nodes are available, ASPH is around 3 times worse than SPH, and ADTH performs 6 times worse than SPH. As the available funds increase, the routing cost reduces until ADTH achieves the same routing cost as SPH (due to the fact that it is based on SPH), whereas ASPH remains about 7% worse than SPH. When the results are examined more closely, it appears that the relative benefit of core routers is independent of the border router group size.
In Figure 9 , the number of active nodes used by ADTH and ASPH averaged over the various tested funds is depicted. ASPH, which is a more "path-oriented" algorithm, uses fewer active nodes than the "tree-oriented" ADTH. This is most prominent for border router group sizes around 40% of the number of nodes in the graph. When funds are abundant, ADTH uses on the average at least 10% more active nodes than ASPH.
Although MC-VPN is NP-hard, on the average, both ADTH and ASPH achieve close to optimal performance. ASPH is significantly better than ADTH when the available funds F are scarce. When funds are abundant, ADTH is slightly better.
Conclusions
In this paper we have addressed the problem of determining a layout of VPN tunnels for an Intranet VPN, while taking into account two factors: the cost of the links over which a VPN tunnels is Active Set VPN (MAS-VPN). We have proved that both problems are not only NP-Hard, but also hard to approximate in the sense that an approximation algorithm achieving an approximation ratio lower than O(log n) is unlikely to exist.
We have presented two heuristics that approximate the optimal solution for MC-VPN (which is more general than MAS-VPN): ADTH and ASPH. Both algorithms use the same general approach.
They first construct a CPE-based solution, that ignores the ability to use core routers as active nodes. Then, they try to improve the solution by spending the funds F on activating core routers in strategic points. The algorithms have been tested using simulations. Their results have been compared to the results produced by a well known approximation algorithm for the Steiner tree 21 problem, which does not find a valid solution for MC-VPN but can serve as a benchmark. Although MC-VPN is NP-hard, on the average, both ADTH and ASPH were shown to achieve close to optimal performance.
